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COMMENT 
 
THE CONSUMER HEALTHCARE DATA MARKET: REDEFINING 
HEALTHCARE MERGERS THROUGH THE LINKED CONSUMER 
RETAIL DATA AND HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETS  
 




     Antitrust laws, as discussed hereunder, are used to prevent competitors 
from merging when the newly-merged company would have a large enough 
market share to enable it to charge monopoly pricing and exert their 
monopoly power to control a competitive market.1 As an example, Amazon 
and Google are not competitors and thus would not be heavily scrutinized 
under the antitrust laws. However, the two corporations would never be 
allowed to merge. But why? The answer is a simple one: data. Amazon and 
Google are both in entirely different industries; however, they are also 
competitors in the Consumer Data Market.  The Consumer Data Market is 
the process of companies acquiring personal data on consumers in order to 
tailor and market products and services to consumers.2  
     However, within the broad Consumer Data Market, there can be well-
defined submarkets.3  This paper will focus on the well-defined Consumer 
Healthcare Data submarket, through an analysis of the Linked Health 
Insurance and the Consumer Retail Data Markets. Specifically, this analysis 
will address the well-defined submarket in U.S. v. Aetna, where the Medicare 
Advantage Plan Market was recognized as a well-defined Health Insurance 
 
* Thaddeus C. Sheehy, Jr.: J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Baltimore School of Law. I 
would like to first thank my family, friends, and especially my fiancé, Emily, for their love 
and support throughout law school. I would also like to thank my faculty advisor, Robert H. 
Lande, for his knowledge and guidance during my drafting process. Last, but certainly not 
least, I would like to thank the entire University of Baltimore Law Forum staff for all their 
hard work editing this comment. 
1 Sherman Anti-Trust Act 15 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. (2004) [hereinafter “Sherman Act”]; Clayton 
Act 15 U.S.C. § 12 et. seq. (2002) [hereinafter “Clayton Act”]. 
2 Meta S. Brown, When and Where to Buy Consumer Data (And 12 Companies Who Sell It), 
FORBES (Sept. 30, 2015, 09:49 AM),  
https://www.forbes.com/sites/metabrown/2015/09/30/when-and-where-to-buy-consumer-
data-and-12-companies-who-sell-it/#2d7ce0683285. 
3 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (holding that within a broad market, 
“well-defined submarkets may exist, which, in themselves, constitute product markets for 
antitrust purposes”); see also FTC v. Staples, 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997). 
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Market.4 In Dino Rikos, the Retail Sales Data Market was recognized as a 
relevant market when denying certiorari for a class action certification.5 
Finally, in WELLPOINT, the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California recognized that a Data Market could be directly and 
inextricably linked to a market to provide medical services (the “Consumer 
Healthcare Data Market”).6   
     Generally, there are three types of mergers that occur in the healthcare 
industry: vertical,7 horizontal,8 and conglomerate.9  A Linked Market exists 
when, at the time of the merger, the companies are using the data from the 
Consumer Retail Data Market to set the insurance rates in the Health 
Insurance Market.10  Linked markets are generally hard to define and account 
for, which does not fit the model of the antitrust laws that were written before 
a digital market place.11 
     Since the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”),12 there has been an increasing trend of retail companies engaging 
mergers with healthcare companies.  Examples of this include Amazon’s 
acquisition of the online pharmacy, PillPack, or CVS Pharmacy’s acquisition 
of the health insurance company, Aetna.13  However, the government did not 
 
4 United States v. Aetna, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1 (2017) (holding that Aetna and Humana 
would not be allowed to merge due to the anti-competitive effects). 
5 Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 1:11-cv-226, 2014 WL 11370455 (S.D. Ohio June 19, 
2014).  
6 In re WELLPOINT, Inc. Out-of-Network “UCR” Rates Litig., 865 F.Supp.2d 1002 (2011) 
(“The relevant product market is the market for data used to calculate UCRs (Usual, 
Customary, and Reasonable rates) for reimbursements of claims by health insurance 
beneficiaries for out-of-network, non-negotiated medical services (the ‘Data Market’). The 
Data Market is directly and inextricably linked to the market for ONS (the ‘Linked ONS 
Market’) in that the Data Market constitutes the primary input to the Linked ONS Market, 
and the Insurer Conspirators use the Data Market to control and depress amounts reimbursed 
in the Linked ONS Market.”).  
7 Roger Wohlner, Mergers and Acquisitions: Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/metabrown/2015/09/30/when-and-where-to-buy-consumer-
data-and-12-companies-who-sell-it/#2d7ce0683285 (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (A vertical 
merger is a merger between “a customer and company or a supplier and company. This of a 
cone supplier merging with an ice cream maker.”). 
8 Id. (A horizontal merger is a merger between “two companies that are in direct competition 
and share the same product lines and markets.”). 
9 Id. (A Conglomerate merger is a merger between “two companies that have no common 
business areas.”). 
10 In Re WELLPOINT, 865 F.Supp.2d 1002. 
11 Id. 
12 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010). 
13  See Luke Lango, Amazon’s acquisition of PillPack is the Start of Something Big, 
INVESTORPLACE (June 29, 2018, 10:03 AM),  
https://investorplace.com/2018/06/amazons-acquisition-pillpack-start-something-big/; 
Kenneth Yood, WHAT SAY YOU, NEW YORK? Now that Federal Antitrust Regulators Have 
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challenge these mergers, which leads to a strong presumption that these 
mergers were evaluated as conglomerate mergers.  There are many pro-
competitive reasons for firms to engage in conglomerate mergers, such as 
efficiency.  However, with the advent of “Patient-Generated Health Data” 
(“PGHD”),14 or data that is gathered by consumers from manual entries or 
the use of health-related information from smartphones and other wearables, 
access to a consumer’s data has become more valuable.  According to a recent 
complaint filed by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), PGHD is 
considered health records data and demonstrates an attempt by the FTC to 
regulate healthcare data.15 
     Included with PGHD is information about a consumer’s lifestyle choice.16  
For instance, large retail consumer data market companies such as Amazon 
can collect such information from the online purchases or grocery store 
choices of their customers from their subsidiary, Whole Foods.17  The 
purchase of Whole Foods enables Amazon to get more precise and focused 
data than they are currently receiving from the use of their e-commerce 
platform, as grocery store purchases are “habitual and frequent.”18  The depth 
and breadth of access to data that Amazon, Walmart, and others in the Retail 
Consumer Data Market have about consumers raises serious antitrust issues 
that require careful analysis in order to protect consumers from monopolistic 
effects.19  Due to these concerns, this paper will redefine the process for 
evaluating mergers between companies in the healthcare and retail industries 
 
Approved CVS’s Proposed Acquisition of Aetna, Attention Turns to New York State, NAT’L 
L. REV. (Oct. 23, 2018),  
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/what-say-you-new-york-now-federal-antitrust-
regulators-have-approved-cvs-s-proposed; Carl O'Donnell and Greg Roumeliotis, Walmart 
talking with Humana on closer ties; acquisition possible: sources, YAHOO FINANCE (Mar. 
30, 2018),  
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/walmart-talking-humana-closer-ties-000530657.html. 
14 What are patient-generated health data?, HEALTH IT SECURITY (Jan. 19, 2018), 
https://www.healthit.gov/topic/otherhot-topics/what-are-patient-generated-health-data. 
15 Jessica Davis, Facebook Accused of Exposing User Health Data in Complaint to FTC, 




17 Greg Petro, Amazon’s Acquisition Of Whole Foods Is About Two Things: Data and 




19 Terrell McSweeny & Brian O’Dea, Data, Innovation, and Potential Competition in Digital 
Markets – Looking Beyond Short-Term Price Effects in Merger Analysis, FTC (Feb. 2018),  
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1321373/cpi-mcsweeny-
odea.pdf. 
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by including an analysis of the direct and inextricable link in the Consumer 
Healthcare Data Market.  Specifically, this paper will demonstrate the “link” 
between the Retail Sales Data and Insurance Markets through the anti-
competitive effects of the potential merger between Walmart and Humana. 
     To understand how mergers are evaluated, Section I will discuss the 
background of antitrust law concerning mergers through the Twelve-Step 
Rule of Reason merger analysis.  Section II will conduct a full Twelve-Step 
Rule of Reason merger analysis on the potential merger between Walmart 
and Humana and the threat this potential merger poses to consumers.  Section 
III will propose stricter enforcement of the antitrust laws for mergers that 
affect Maryland and increased regulations on how companies are allowed to 




     When Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 (“Sherman 
Act”),20 the intent was a “comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed 
at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”21  The 
Sherman Act and Clayton Act ensure that competition22 is protected by 
precluding contracts or combinations that “unreasonably” restrain 
competition.23  Together, these acts represent an effort by Congress to 
provide a reasonable curb to the confessed industrial and commercial abuses 
of the time as greed for profit ran wild.24  With time the court developed a 
better understanding of the economic effects of corporations and evaluated 
whether a merger would unreasonably restrain trade by conducting an 
economic analysis of the relevant market.25  The FTC’s 2010 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines (“2010 Guidelines”)26 that regulate acquisitions and 
 
20 Sherman Anti-Trust Act 15 U.S.C. §1 et seq.; Clayton Act 15 U.S.C. §12 et. seq. 
21 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).  
22 Chelsea Levinson, Types of Competition in Economics, BIZFLUENT (June 08, 2018), 
https://bizfluent.com/info-7904519-types-competition-economics.html (competition is 
present in a market when there are a number of companies providing a product or service in 
the same market. When there is not sufficient competition in a market, a monopoly is present 
and leads to increased costs for consumers).  
23 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 90 (1911); Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United 
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918).   
24 Charles Nagel, The Origin and Purpose of the Sherman Act, 15 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 313, 
318-19 (1930),  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss4/1. 
25 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 592 (1957). 
26 U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, FTC (2010), 
available at http://ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf. [hereinafter, 2010 Guidelines]. 
 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 50.1 32 
mergers (“mergers”) are subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act27 and section 
7 of the Clayton Act.28  In order to demonstrate antitrust violations that would 
occur as the result of a proposed merger, the court requires the presence  of 
several different factors.29  
     First, courts must determine the relevant product market (the “line of 
commerce”).30  Second, the courts must determine the relevant geographic 
market.31  After defining both relevant markets, courts will be able to 
establish whether a merger is considered vertical, horizontal, or 
conglomerate.32  A vertical merger is a merger between a customer and a 
company or a supplier and a company,33  whereas a horizontal merger is a 
merger between two companies that are in direct competition and share the 
same product lines and markets,34  and a conglomerate merger is a merger 
between two companies that have no common business areas.35  If the 
Consumer Healthcare Data Market were considered a horizontal market that 
can be used to affect the healthcare and pricing decisions for Marylanders, 
courts apply the “Rule of Reason” analysis.36   
     The “Rule of Reason” analysis compares the pro-competitive and anti-
competitive effects on the relevant product and geographic market at issue.37  
There are a number of ways that a court can analyze a potential merger, but 
where the anti-competitive effects are not intuitively obvious, the Twelve-
Step Rule of Reason analysis needs to be conducted.38  The method that this 
analysis will focus on is the more detailed twelve-step merger analysis 
because the Consumer Healthcare Data Market is a new way to look at 
 
27 Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1 et. seq., (mergers subject to § 1 are prohibited if they constitute 
a “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade . . . “); see also 2010 
Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 18-19. 
28 Clayton Act § 12 et. seq., (mergers subject to § 7 are prohibited if their effect “may be 
substantially to lessen completion, or to tend to create a monopoly.”); see also 2010 
Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 18-19. 
29 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 1, at 1. 
30 du Pont, 353 U.S. at 589. 
31 United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371-72 (1963) (holding that merging 
companies with greater than thirty percent market share cannot merge and that merging 
companies cannot counterbalance pro-competitive effects in one market with anti-
competitive effects in another market). 
32 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 4, at 7. 
33 Mitchell Grant & Will Kenton, Horizontal Merger: INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/horizontalmerger.asp (last visited Sept. 24, 2019).  
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Standard Oil, supra note 23. 
37 Id. 
38 FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.D.C. 2001); see also California Dental Ass’n 
v. FTC, 119 S.Ct. 1604, 1606 (1999). 
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mergers between the Consumer Retail Data and Health Insurance Markets.  
The Twelve-Step Rule of Reason merger analysis is:  
(1) product market definition; (2) geographic market 
definition; (3) number of market participants and relative 
market share; (4) market concentration; (5) unilateral effects 
with a corporation’s ability to raise prices, decrease quality or 
variety of offerings, or raise a rival’s costs; (6) potential for 
coordinated effects – such as collusion; (7) powerful buyers in 
the market; (8) ease of entry into the relevant market; (9) 
efficiencies in allowing the merger; (10) is there a failing 
company or division; (11) is this a merger of competing 
buyers; (12) or would this be considered a partial 
acquisition.39   
The Twelve-Step Rule of Reason merger analysis contains several tests and 
methods in each step to determine the impact(s) a merger may have on 
consumers and competition.40  
     However, the Twelve-Step Rule of Reason analysis relies on a traditional 
price-based model for merger analysis that may not be effective in showing 
the anti-competitive effects.41  This approach may not be effective because it 
is common for there to be two-sided markets where consumers provide 
information on themselves for “free” in one market, and where the 
information is used in a second market to charge for products or services.42  
Data is a competitive asset for a corporation, and some argue that data 
aggregation is not an issue because it does not prevent competitors from 
simultaneously using that data.43  However, data with a competitive 
significance may be hard to obtain, and companies possessing that data will 
have little incentive to share.44 Additionally, innovation in a merger may 
include a non-price dimension of current competition, such as the ability for 
companies to gather, store, and process PGHD.45  Although the Rule of 
Reason analysis may not be effective in fully demonstrating the anti-
 
39 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26; see also The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of 
Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, Department of Justice, available 
at: https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/merger-guidelines-and-integration-efficiencies-
antitrust-review-horizontal-mergers (last visited November 25, 2019)(explaining the 
integration of the Rule of Reason analysis into the Horizontal Merger Guidelines over time). 
40 Id. 




45 Id.; see also 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, at 2. 
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competitive effects, until the FTC changes its guidelines, it is the best and 
only tool provided for antitrust analysis.46  
     Since the issue of the anti-competitive effects from data has been plaguing 
our country, the FTC has created a new Technology Task Force (“Task 
Force”).47  The mandate of the Task Force includes reviewing mergers that 
have already been approved and challenging new mergers that could have 
anti-competitive effects.48  However, the Task Force does not currently have 
a plan to change the 2010 Guidelines related to the technology sector.49  Since 
the anti-competitive effects of the potential merger between Walmart and 
Humana are not intuitively obvious because the market is new and difficult 
to understand, the Twelve-Step Rule of Reason analysis is required to 




A. How the Consumer Healthcare Data Market can and has been used to 
set Health Insurers to Insurance Prices 
 
     The broad Consumer Data Market is essentially an abstract portrait of who 
an individual is, and more importantly whom an individual is when compared 
to other people.51  Consumer data can be used to compromise individuals 
because companies are building models or avatars of individuals in the cloud 
and showing hundreds of thousands of videos to this avatar to see what 
advertising messaging is effective.52  The purpose of companies doing this 
practice is to create a persuasion and prediction tool for consumers, and the 
Consumer Data Market is just in its infancy.53  In years past, advertisers paid 
companies a cost per thousand views (“CPM”) for a marketing campaign, but 
today companies in the Consumer Data Market are paid on a cost per action 
(“CPA”).54  The data a company acquires about consumers consists of 
 
46 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 6.2, at 22. 
47 John McKinnon, FTC’s New Task Force Could Be Trouble for Big Tech, WALL STREET J. 
(Feb. 28, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftcs-new-task-force-could-be-
trouble-for-big-tech-11551357000; see also Frank Bajak, Top antitrust enforcer warns Big 
Tech over data collection, Newstimes (Nov. 8, 2019) ("Antitrust enforcers cannot turn a 
blind eye to the serious competition questions that digital markets have raised").  
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 California Dental Ass’n, 119 S.Ct. at 1606. 
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intimate personal details (e.g. race or sexual orientation_ derived from their 
behavioral history and not the result of consumer disclosure to the company.55  
While it would be difficult to show the effect of data in our personal lives, 
the value of an individual’s data, when combined with everyone else’s data, 
is priceless, even without companies having access to healthcare data.56  
     For an example of how valuable and impactful it would be for a company 
to have access to data in healthcare, think of the data that Amazon and 
Walmart have on their consumers.  These companies know what consumers 
purchased, what products they did not purchase, the location of the 
consumers, and which advertisements were effective on those consumers.  
Now, imagine that one of these companies has a consumer that regularly 
purchases soft drinks and junk food and is a customer for that company’s 
healthcare business. Currently, health insurers are gathering lifestyle data on 
consumers to link patients’ medical outcomes and costs to the details of their 
personal lives, like their level of education, net worth, retail purchases, family 
structure, and race.57  The implication of this is a future where everything an 
individual does, purchases, eats, and time they spend watching television is 
used to determine how much that individual pays for health insurance.58  That 
future, according to a research scientist from an unnamed insurance company, 
is today.59  
     In WELLPOINT, the data used to set consumers’ rates for both out-of-
network healthcare services and the Insurance Market were considered 
“Linked Markets.”60  A “Linked Market” can also be demonstrated in the 
Consumer Retail Data Market and the Medicare Advantage Plan Market, 
collectively, the Consumer Healthcare Data Market.  Humana is one of the 
four largest companies to provide Medicare Advantage Plans to customers in 
Maryland.61 Additionally, an estimated 95% of all consumers shopped at 




57 Marshall Allen, Health Insurers Are Vacuuming Up Details About You – And It Could 




59 Id. (When asked if customer data is used to set prices, “a research scientist from one 
company told (Allen): ‘I can’t say it hasn’t happened.’”). 
60 In Re WELLPOINT, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 1029-31.  
61 Continued Enrollment Growth in Employer-Group Medicare Advantage, MARK FARRAH 
ASSOCIATES (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.markfarrah.com/mfa-briefs/continued-
enrollment-growth-in-employer-group-medicare-advantage/. 
62 Krystina Gustafson, Nearly every American spent money at Wal-Mart last year, CNBC 
NEWS (Apr. 12, 2017, 9:58 AM),  
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share, it is the type of data that is difficult and costly to obtain that may 
operate as a barrier to entry for potential new entrants, or new competitive 
companies, in the Consumer Healthcare Data Market that raises anti-
competitive concerns.63 
     In Maryland, there are approximately 107,000 Medicare Advantage Plan 
patients.64  These patients represent approximately 36% of Maryland’s total 
Medicare Beneficiaries in 2019, which is an 11.5% increase in the total 
Medicare Beneficiaries from 2018.65  Humana has approximately 14% of the 
total Medicare Advantage customers in Maryland.66  Additionally, Humana’s 
Medicare Advantage Plan is available to 91% of beneficiaries nationally.67  
Further, Humana added more seniors to its individual Medicare Advantage 
plans than any of its rivals between 2013 and 2016.68 
     Because of Humana’s prominence, the potential merger between Walmart 
and Humana would create a significant risk of anti-competitive effects that 
exist in Linked Markets.69  The risk for anti-competitive effects is heighted 
by the current practice of insurance companies using consumer retail data to 
set rates for insurers.70  Finally, since insurance companies are seeking to use 
the consumer data to set insurance premiums, Marylanders are at risk of 
Walmart and Humana gaining a sole monopoly position in the Consumer 
Healthcare Data Market.71  Walmart would be able to accomplish this through 
the use of its sixty retail stores in Maryland.72 This next section will apply the 
Twelve-Step Rule of Reason merger analysis to the potential merger between 





63 McSweeny, supra note 19, at 7. 
64 Medicare Advantage in Maryland, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE.COM, 
https://www.medicareadvantage.com/plans-by-state/maryland (last visited June 30, 2019). 
65 Medicare Advantage premiums continue to decline while plan choices and benefits 
increase in 2019, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (Sept. 28, 2018), 
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/medicare-advantage-premiums-continue-
decline-while-plan-choices-and-benefits-increase-2019 (This is an estimated figure based on 
the total national numbers). 
66 Continued Enrollment Growth in Employer-Group Medicare Advantage, supra note 61. 
67 Aetna, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 10.  
68 Id. 
69 In Re WELLPOINT, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 1002.  
70 Allen, supra note 57, at 3. 
71 Dana Mattioli, et al., Walmart in Early-Stage Acquisition Talks With Humana, WALL 
STREET J. (Mar. 29, 2018, 8:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/walmart-in-early-stage-
acquisition-talks-with-humana-1522365618. 
72 Walmart Location Facts, Maryland, WALMART (last updated Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://corporate.walmart.com/our-story/locations/united-states/maryland#/united-
states/maryland.  
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B. Application of the Twelve-Step Rule of Reason Analysis for the Potential 
Walmart-Humana Merger 
 
1. (1) Defining the Relevant Product and (2) Geographic Markets 
 
     The most important and debated part of this analysis is the relevant 
product and the relevant geographic market definitions.73  If the merger is not 
in the same market, or well-defined submarket,74 it would either not have 
enough concentration or would not otherwise be subject to the strict 
horizontal merger analysis.75  The geographic market’s scope generally 
depends on transportation costs, but may also include language, regulations, 
tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, custom and familiarity, reputation, and 
service availability which may impede long-distance or international 
transactions.76  For the purpose of the analysis of the immediate issue, the 
relevant geographic market will be Maryland.77 
     Defining the relevant product and geographic markets is the most 
important and divisive step of the merger analysis process.78  The FTC’s 2010 
Guidelines provide two critical tools used to define the effects of a merger in 
the relevant product markets: the “hypothetical monopolist test” and the 
“Small but Significant but Non-Transitory Increase in Price” (“SSNIP”) 
benchmark.79  Together, both tests are used to define both the relevant 
product and geographic markets, which form the basis for any antitrust 
analysis.   
     The “hypothetical monopolist test” is used to identify a set of products 
that are reasonably interchangeable with a product sold by one of the merging 
firms.80  This test requires that a product market “contain enough substitute 
products so that it could be subject to post-merger exercise of market power 
 
73 Arthur N. Lerner, Mergers: Antitrust Issues for Hospitals and Health Plans, AM. HEALTH 
LAW.’S ASS’N, at 6, 16 (June 30 – July 2, 2008),  
https://www.crowell.com/documents/Mergers_Antitrust-Issues-for-Hospitals-and-Health-
Plans_Lerner.pdf. 
74 F.T.C. v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1075 (D.D.C. 1997); see also Brown Shoe Co. 
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325–26, 82 S. Ct. 1502, 1524, 8 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1962). 
75 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 1, at 1. 
76 Id.; see also United States v. Phila. Nat‘l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363, 83 S. Ct. 1715, 1741, 
10 L. Ed. 2d 915 (1963). 
77 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26 (“The arena of competition affected by the merger may be 
geographically bounded if geography limits some customers’ willingness or ability to 
substitute some products, or some suppliers’ willingness or ability to serve some customers. 
Both supplier and customer locations can affect this.”). 
78 Lerner, supra note 73. 
79 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 4.1.1, at 9. 
80 Id. §4.1, at 9. 
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significantly exceeding that existing absent the merger.”81  The specific 
requirement is that a “hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject to 
price regulation, that was the only present and future seller of those products 
(“hypothetical monopolist”) likely would impose at least… [SSNIP] on at 
least one product in the market, including at least one product sold by one of 
the merging firms.”82  The application of the SSNIP test involves 
interviewing consumers regarding buying decisions and determining whether 
a hypothetical monopolist could profit from a price increase of five percent 
for at least one year.83 
     When conducting a SSNIP test, all terms of sale of products outside of 
Maryland are held constant.84  The SSNIP test is only a tool for the 
hypothetical monopolist test; it is not designed as a tolerance level for price 
increases resulting from the merger.85  The SSNIP test in effect is defining 
the cross-elasticity of demand – a measurement to the responsiveness in the 
quantity demanded of one good when the price for another changes.86  The 
hypothetical monopolist test may also include products that are not in the 
relevant market, so long as a customer would substitute with those products 
in response to a price increase.87   
     In Aetna, a SSNIP test concluded that individual Medicare Advantage 
plans constituted a relevant product market.88  The SSNIP test imposed a 
SNNIP of 5% and 10%, and the Medicare Advantage Plan Market passed the 
hypothetical monopolist test for the majority of the 364 counties in the 
complaint.89  While this is not an exact figure, because of the challenge 
involved in surveying thousands of Maryland Medicare Advantage Plan 
customers, it provides a useful guide of Humana’s hypothetical monopolist 
position.90  
     However, for companies like Walmart, the SSNIP test will need to be 
conducted for a number of different product markets because the data could 
be used in various well-defined submarkets.91  The product variances 




83 Id. at 10.  
84 Id. 
85 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, §4.1, at 9.  
86 Will Kenton, Cross Elasticity of Demand, INVESTOPEDIA, (last updated July 22, 2018), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cross-elasticity-demand.asp. 
87 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 4.1, at 9. 
88 Aetna, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 35. 
89 Id. at 36. 
90 Id. 
91 See generally Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. 294. 
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of the SSNIP test.92  As an example, Walmart’s flu shot is “Product A,” and 
its competitor’s flu shot is “Product B.” Each flu shot sells for $100, has an 
incremental cost of $60, and each company sells 1,200 units.93  For every 
dollar increase in Product A with any given price for Product B, Product A 
loses twenty units of sales to products outside of this candidate market.94  Ten 
units would also be lost to Product B.95 Likewise, if the same price increase 
occurred with Product B, then ten units would be lost to Product A.96 
Economic analysis of this result demonstrates that Walmart and its 
competitor would raise their prices to $110 and satisfy a SSNIP test of up to 
10%.97  This is true despite the fact that two-thirds of the sales lost by one 
product are diverted to products outside of the relevant market with a price 
increase.98  A SSNIP test of up to 10% means that Walmart would be able to 
charge monopoly pricing for its flu shots and competition would not likely 
be timely, sufficient, or likely to prohibit the anti-competitive effects.99  
     Additionally, when reviewing a merger, part of the review of the effects 
is to ensure that a merging company is not going to use its monopoly power 
in one market to gain monopoly power in another market.100  For example, 
Walmart cannot use its monopoly power in retail sales market to gain 
monopoly power in the pharmaceutical market by providing a discount to 
Humana’s Medicare Advantage Plan customers.   
 
2. Determining the (3) Market Participants,101 Market Shares,102 and (4) 
Concentration in the Relevant Product and Geographic Markets 
 
     There are two primary ways that courts determine the relative product 
market concentration.  In the FTC’s 1968 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
 
92 Flu Shots & Immunizations, WALMART,  
https://www.walmart.com/cp/Immunizations-Flu-Shots/1228302  
(last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 






99 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 4.1, at 9. 
100 Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321. 
101 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.1 (explaining that market participants includes all 
firms currently earning revenue in the relevant market and firms that are not currently 
producing in the relevant market but would very likely provide rapid supply responses with 
a direct competitive impact in the event of a SSNIP, without incurring significant sunk costs).  
102 Id. § 5.2, at 16 (explaining that market shares are normally calculated with shares of all 
firms that currently produce products in the relevant market, provided that this data is 
available).  
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(“1968 Guidelines”), the FTC used the Four-Firm Concentration Ratio 
(“CR4”).103  The CR4 is the sum of the largest four firms in the market shares, 
and if the merging firms are greater than thirty percent, the merger will not 
be permitted.104  
     In the FTC’s 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“1982 Guidelines”), the 
FTC still used the CR4, but included a new measure of geographic market 
share105: the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”).106  However, in the 
FTC’s 2010 Guidelines, the FTC abandoned the CR4 approach for the HHI 
approach to determine the target company’s geographic market share.107  
While the 2010 Guidelines abandoned the use of the CR4 approach, it is still 
a useful tool used by the courts to determine the target company’s product 
market share because the HHI is not always the best indicator.108   
     The HHI consists of the sums of the squares of all market participants’ 
shares in the market before and after the merger based on the relative size of 
all firms.109  The advantage of the HHI approach is that it takes into account 
every firm that participates in the market, rather than just the largest four 
firms in a market place.110  “The HHI is calculated by taking the market share 
 
103 Antitrust Div. Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 2, 16, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (1968) 
[hereinafter “1968 Guidelines”],  
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.pdf. 
104 Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 636-67 (holding that a merger with greater than thirty 
percent may substantially lessen competition because the newly merged company would 
have an undue percentage share of the relevant market. However, the merging companies 
may be able to rebut the notion that thirty percent market share may substantially lessen 
competition with a clear showing that the merger will not have this anti-competitive effect).  
105 See sources cited infra note 105 (as an example, in Maryland, CVS may have 50% of the 
prescription pharmacy revenue for consumers at home, while Walgreens has 20%, Grocery 
Stores have 20%, and locally-owned pharmacies have the rest). 
106 Antitrust Div. Horizontal Merger Guidelines § III.A at 12, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
(1982) [hereinafter, “1982 Guidelines”],  
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11248.pdf; see also U.S. Antitrust Div.’s Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines § 3.10 at 8-9, 12-13, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (1984) [hereinafter “1984 
Guidelines”],  
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11249.pdf. 
107 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26 (The CR4 approach was abandoned because the HHI 
approach was seen as being able to include more of the marketplace by counting all 
companies in the relevant market, rather than just the largest four). 
108 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 501-04 (1974) (holding that past 
production and an HHI increase does not always predict future competitive effects.  Despite 
the proposed merger and increase in HHI, all of the coal in the merger in issue had already 
been contracted and accounted for, so the increase in market concentration would not 
enhance General Dynamic’s market power). 
109 Adam Hayes, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index – HHI, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 29, 2018) 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hhi.asp. 
110 See id. (Absent one of the largest four firms merging with a fifth firm that is not one of 
those largest four firms). 
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of each firm in the industry, squaring them, and summing the result” and can 
range up to an HHI of 10,000.111  The HHI calculation results in a 
proportionately greater weight given to larger firms, since they have a larger 
market share than the smaller firms.112  When conducting an HHI calculation, 
agencies such as the FTC, consider both the pre-merger level113 of the HHI 
and the increase of HHI resulting from the merger.114  The increase in the 
HHI level is equal to the squared sum of the merging firms and all other firms 
in the market.115   
     The 2010 Guidelines do not provide strict rules116 to determine whether 
the increase in the defined relevant markets will raise significant anti-
competitive concerns; however, it has set forth general standards.117  The four 
general standards for measuring an increase in market share are Small 
Change in Concentration,118 Unconcentrated Markets,119 Moderately 
Concentrated Markets,120 and Highly Concentrated Markets.121  However, the 
presumption that the merger would lead to anti-competitive effects “may be 
rebutted with persuasive evidence that the merger is unlikely to enhance 
market power.”122  Additionally, the HHI calculation is more subject to error 
 
111 See Hayes, supra note 108. 
112 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 18. 
113 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 18. (Noting that the pre-merger level of the 
market is the current concentration of the market based on the HHI levels of all competitors 
in the market prior to the merger commencing).  
114 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 18. 
115 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 18. 
116 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 1 (Explaining that the FTC stated that the purpose of 
the guidelines is to provide the business community and antitrust practitioners with the 
analytical process of the FTC, as well as assisting courts in developing an appropriate 
framework for interpreting and applying antitrust laws). 
117 Id. § 5.3, at 19. 
118  2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 19 (“Mergers involving an increase in the HHI 
of less than 100 points are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects and ordinarily require 
no further analysis.”). 
119 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 19 (“Mergers resulting in unconcentrated 
markets are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects and ordinarily require no further 
analysis.”). 
120 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26 § 5.3, at 19 (“Mergers resulting in moderately 
concentrated markets that involve an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points potentially 
raise significant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny.”). 
121 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26 § 5.3, at 19 (“Mergers resulting in highly concentrated 
markets that involve an increase in the HHI of between 100 points and 200 points potentially 
raise significant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny. Mergers resulting in highly 
concentrated markets that involve an increase in the HHI of more than 200 points will be 
presumed to be likely to enhance market power. The presumption may be rebutted by 
persuasive evidence showing that the merger is unlikely to enhance market power.”). 
122 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 19; see also United States v. General Dynamics 
Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).  
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than the CR4 approach because if a firm’s percentage was 30%, but 
incorrectly measured at 35%, then the CR4 would only be off by 5%.  
However, application of the HHI calculation results in a 325 point increase.123  
For this reason, both the CR4 and HHI are critical when evaluating the market 
concentration in the relevant product and geographic markets.  
     In order to show the current market concentrations for the Consumer 
Retail Data and Medicare Advantage Plan Markets, this analysis will used an 
estimated CR4 and HHI approach.124  For Humana, the following data is 
based on the 2017 national enrollment for Medicare Advantage Plans by the 
company.125  The market shares are as follows: Company 1 is 24%, Humana 
is 17%, Company 3 is 13%, Company 4 is 8%, Company 5 is 7%, Company 
6 is 3%, Company 7 is 2%, Company 8 is 2%, and the remaining companies 
are estimated at 1% each for the remaining 24% market share.126 Under the 
CR4 approach, the merger would be presumed as anti-competitive if Humana 
was able to increase its market share to 30% as a result of the merger.127  The 
pre-merger HHI level is 1,188, or an unconcentrated market.128  Additionally, 
under either approach, since Walmart does not currently sell health 
insurance,129 the market shares show that there would not be an increase in 
market share above a competitive level. 
     However, Walmart, in comparison, has a 95% market share in the 
Consumer Retail Data Market.130  The 95% figure represents the estimated 
percentage of consumers in the United States that shopped at Walmart in 
2016.131  Walmart has the largest percentage of total United States retail 
customers of any company in the United States.132  In the Matter of Reed 
Elsevier, FTC’s consent decree stated that even though other firms could 
possess this relevant data, other companies may not be able to compete 
 
123 Calculated as 35% market concentration as 35^2 = 1,225 and 30% market concentration 
as 30^2 = 900, and then subtracting the difference: 1,225 – 900 = 325. 
124 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 18 (explaining that this figure will be estimated 
because without the financial resources to be able to discover this information, it will be 
difficult to provide exact figures). 
125 Gretchen Jacobson, et al., Medicare Advantage 2017 Spotlight: Enrollment Market 
Update, KFF (June 6, 2017), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/medicare-advantage-
2017-spotlight-enrollment-market-update/. 
126 Jacobson, supra note 124. 
127 Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 364. 
128 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 18 (HHI calculated as: 24^2 + 17^2 + 13^2 + 
8^2 + 7^2+3^2 + 2^2 + 2^2 + 1^2*24 (representing the remaining 24% market share) 
=1,188). 
129 Walmart Inc., YAHOO! FINANCE, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/WMT/profile (last 
updated Oct. 4, 2019, 4:00PM). 
130 Gustafson, supra note 62. 
131 Gustafson, supra note 62. 
132 Gustafson, supra note 62. 
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effectively because of the combination of data and analytics capabilities.133  
As a result of its data and analytics abilities,134 Walmart continues growing 
in the online retail market with a projected sales increase of 35% in 2019.135  
This is exactly the type of monopoly power that Walmart has in the Consumer 
Retail Data Market that would lead to anti-competitive effects in the 
Consumer Healthcare Data Market.136 
     Presently, however, there are no competitors in the Consumer Healthcare 
Data Market.137  So through the CR4 approach, the resulting merger would 
leave Walmart and Humana with essentially 100% market share.  Under 
Phila. Nat'l Bank, this would be far greater than the 30% benchmark for 
courts to determine that the resulting merger would likely be anti-
competitive.138  Similarly, with the HHI approach, the resulting merger would 
lead to a concentration of 10,000 or a highly concentrated market.139  The 
HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the pre-merger market share of 
“0” and the post-merger market share of “100.”140  With companies using 
information in the Consumer Retail Data Market in order to set health 
insurance rates, the Consumer Healthcare Data Market represents a Linked 
Market.141 Through either the CR4 or HHI approach, the decision in Alcoa 
shows that the merger between Walmart and Humana would have a 
monopoly and monopoly power that is illegal per se in the Consumer 




133 McSweeny, supra note 19 (citing Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order to 
Aid Public Comment, In the Matter of Reed Elsevier and ChoicePoint, File No. 081-0133 
(Sept. 16, 2008) at 2-3), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/fles/documents/cases/2008/09/080916reedelseviercpanal.
pdf. 
134 Nandita Bose, Walmart seeks ad business boost in fight with Amazon, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 
2019, 12:11 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-walmart-suppliers-advertising-
idUSKCN1QF25M. (Discussing the ad growth Walmart anticipates by consolidating 
advertising sales for its stores and websites). 
135 Haris Anwar, Walmart, Target Have Cracked The Online Sales Code, With Impressive 
Growth, INVESTING.COM (Mar. 7, 2019, 1:30 AM), https://www.investing.com/analysis/one-
big-reason-to-buy-shares-of-walmart-and-target-200395056. 
136 See McSweeny, supra note 19, at 4.  
137 Mattioli, supra note 72. 
138 Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 364.  
139 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 18.  
140 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5, at 15.  
141 Allen, supra note 57. 
142 Gustafson, supra note 62. See 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5; see 
also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America et al., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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3. (5) Unilateral Effects with a Corporation’s Ability to Raise Prices, 
Decrease Quality or Variety of Product Offerings, or to Raise a Rival’s Cost  
 
     When competition is eliminated between two firms competing in a 
relevant market by way of a merger, the resulting unilateral effects may alone 
substantially lessen competition.143  Mergers are evaluated by agencies and 
courts to look at the effect that a merger will have on consumers in the 
relevant market place.144   The Sherman Act represented an effort to provide 
a reasonable curb to the confessed industrial and commercial abuses of the 
time as greed for profit ran wild.145  A merging corporation’s ability to raise 
prices, decrease quality or variety of product offerings, or raising a rival’s 
costs are at the heart of antitrust enforcement.146   
     Companies that engage in consolidation in a relevant product and 
geographic market are able to abuse their market power and raise prices 
above the competitive level.147  According to a study by the Center for 
American Progress, one of the ways that this is happening in the healthcare 
industry is through healthcare provider consolidation.148  The ability to raise 
prices through market power occurs in concentrated markets where a small 
number of competitors control most of the sales and generally have higher 
prices due to the lack of competition.149  The SSNIP test is used to 
demonstrate incremental price increases.150  The SSNIP test provides a tool 
to determine if a merging company can raise prices above the competitive 
level in the relevant market based on all available substitutes.151  By 
measuring this cross-elasticity of demand with the SSNIP test, agencies and 
courts can determine if the merger will lead to increased pricing because of a 
product with a low cross-elasticity of demand.152  However, as was seen in 
 
143 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 6, at 20.   
144 Sherman Act, supra note 1 “comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at 
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”. 
145 Nagel, supra note 24.  
146 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 6, at 20.   
147 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 6, at 20.   
148 Emily Gee & Ethan Gurwitz, Provider Consolidation Drives Up Health Care Costs, 
AMERICAN PROGRESS, Dec. 5, 2018, 8:00 AM,  
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/reports/2018/12/05/461780/provider-
consolidation-drives-health-care-costs/. 
149 Id.  
150 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 4.1, at 9; see also infra Part II.B.i. 
151 du Pont, 353 U.S. 586; see also Satellite Television & Associated Resources, Inc. v. 
Cont‘l Cablevision of Va., Inc., 714 F.2d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied. 
152 Will Kenton, Cross Elasticity of Demand, supra note 85; see also Staples, 970 F. Supp. 
at 1078-79 (holding that there was a low cross-elasticity of demand between the potential 
merging companies, Staples and Office Depot in comparison to other companies that sold 
office goods, such as Walmart. The court reasoned that many of the consumers that went to 
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du Pont, a SSNIP test could be an ineffective measurement because du Pont 
was already a monopoly charging monopoly prices.153 
     When a merging company has the incentive to reduce product quality after 
the merger is complete and independent of competitive responses from other 
firms, the reduction in quality is considered an anti-competitive effect that 
may substantially lessen competition.154  The effects of reducing the quality 
or variety of product offerings may have a direct impact on consumers’ ability 
to choose between products in a competitive market.  As can be seen in Brown 
Shoe,155 the unilateral effect of pricing occurs when raising rivals’ costs, just 
as it would in raising the price of a merging company’s own goods because 
of the detrimental effects to the consumer.  In Brown Shoe, the effect of the 
horizontal and vertical merging of the manufacturing and retail facilities 
would have raised their rivals’ costs by forcing their competitors to create 
more facilities to meet consumer demand.156  The result, if not stopped prior 
to a merger occurring, is best seen in Aspen Skiing.157  In Aspen, three of the 
four major ski resort areas in Aspen, Colorado, offered interchangeable lift 
tickets and refused to let the fourth resort engage in this interchangeable ticket 
when they had previously done so.158  By doing so, the monopolist effectively 
decreased the variety of skiing options to consumers and raised their rival’s 
costs because the fourth company was not able to benefit from the 
interchangeable tickets.159 
     The unilateral effects are readily apparent in the Consumer Healthcare 
Data Market, a differentiated market where some products are very close 
substitutes and compete strongly with one another, while other products are 
 
Staples or Office Depot for office supplies would not look to go to Walmart as an available 
substitute). 
153 du Pont, 353 U.S. 586; see also Aron & Burnstein, Regulatory Policy and the Reverse 
Cellophane Fallacy (Dec. 4, 2010), J. OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECON., Vol. 6, Issue 4, pp. 
973-994, 2010. Available at SSRN:  
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1171292 (discussing that because du Pont already had a monopoly 
and was charging monopoly pricing, the SSNIP test was not an adequate measure of raising 
pricing at a competitive level in the marketplace). 
154 FTC v. Swedish Match N. Am., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 173 (2000) (holding that the 
merger should be enjoined because the FTC demonstrated a “reasonable probability” that the 
merger may substantially lessen competition by reducing the quality and variety of the 
offerings). 
155 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 324 (In Brown Shoe, the proposed merger was an integration of 
both vertical and horizontal mergers for shoe manufacturing and retail). 
156 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 337-39. 
157 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 589-91 (1985).  
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 609-610 (holding that there was no valid reason for discontinuing the participation 
of the fourth ski resort in the interchangeable ticketing). 
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substitutes that are more distant and are not as strong of competitors.160  As 
an example, BMW and Lexus sedans compete with each other for consumers 
more readily than either company does with a Dodge sedan.  A merger 
between companies selling differentiated products may unilaterally raise one 
or both of the products above the pre-merger price and capture sales lost to 
the other differentiated product.  In Heinz, both potentially merging 
companies were found to be selling in a differentiated “second-shelf” market 
for Gerber baby foods.161  The post-merger ability to increase pricing was 
shown to likely substantially lessen competition because they were the only 
two companies selling in this “second-shelf” market by raising prices on 
those products against Gerber, who did not effectively compete with either 
company.162  An example of Walmart and Humana’s ability to unilaterally 
affect the market would be that the merger would result in forcing rivals in 
the Health Insurance Market to gain access to more consumer data in order 
to compete with the newly-merged company. 
 
4. (6) Potential for Coordinated Effects 
 
     Mergers may enable or encourage post-merger coordinated effects, or 
collusion between firms in the relevant market that diminishes competition 
and ultimately harms consumers.163  The reason this is analyzed and 
prohibited is that “collusion typically leads to monopoly-like outcomes, 
including monopoly profits that are shared by the colluding parties.”164  Firms 
involved in collusion are generally referred to as “cartels” when looking to 
harm consumers in the relevant market.165  The simple way of thinking about 
this from a merger perspective is that when fewer firms are competing in a 
relevant market, collusion becomes easier.  There are three types of collusion 
that can occur after a merger: Type I involves collective action to raise price 
 
160 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 6.1, at 20-1.  
161 Heinz, 246 F.3d at 718 (A “second-shelf” market occurs when there is one dominate 
company in the relevant market, while other companies are competing for the “second spot 
on the shelf.” As an example, in Maryland, Old Bay is known to have a monopoly on crab 
seasoning, while other companies compete for the “second-shelf” market). 
162 Id. 
163 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 7, at 24. (“Coordinated interaction involves conduct by 
multiple firms that is profitable for each of them only as a result of the accommodating 
reactions of the others.”). 
164 Robert H. Lande & Howard P. Marvel, The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices, 
Rivals, and Rules, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 941 (2000).  
165 Id.; see also 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 7, at 24. Collusion (“involves conduct by 
multiple firms that is profitable for each of them only as a result of the accommodating 
reactions of the others.”). 
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directly;166 Type II involves disadvantaging rivals in a manner that causes the 
rivals output to diminish or causes their behavior to become chastened;167 and 
Type III involves firms fixing the rules of competition in the relevant 
market.168  
     However, the ability of rival firms to engage in any type of collusion can 
depend on the market concentration and strength as well as the predictability 
of the rival firms in the market to respond to price or other competitive 
initiatives.169  Additionally, when firms merge, it can increase market 
concentration to enable firms to strengthen their positions and to create more 
incentives for other firms in the market to act in a coordinated or collusive 
manner.170 When looking at a merger, agencies are likely to challenge a 
merger if: “(1) the merger would significantly increase concentration and lead 
to a moderately or highly concentrated market; (2) the market shows signs of 
vulnerability to coordinated conduct;171 and (3) the agencies have a credible 
basis on which to conclude that the merger may enhance that 
vulnerability.”172 
     As an example, if Walmart and Humana were allowed to merge, the 
merger would result in a monopoly in the Consumer Healthcare Data 
Market.173  If another company entered the Consumer Healthcare Data 
Market, Walmart might have an incentive to collude, either explicitly or 
implicitly, with other firms.  The incentive occurs when it allows Walmart 
and Humana to maintain its monopoly position and charge monopoly 
 
166 Lande, supra note 163 “The monopoly outcome arises as the cartel members agree either 
to restrict output (such as OPEC), to raise prices, or to divide markets”; See also du Pont, 
supra note 25 where the FTC was unsuccessful in challenging this type of practice. 
167 Id. (explaining that there is type of collusion “consists of agreements to take action jointly 
to harm rivals that are not party to the collusion”); see also N.W. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. 
v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985) (holding that a purchasing co-
operative’s joint effort to coerce suppliers and customers to deny a relationship that 
competitors needed was an illegal way to disadvantage a rival).  
168 Id. Type III collusion “includes instances of collusion that are often subtle and complex. 
Most examples of collusion to manipulate the rules of competition have arisen in industries 
with heterogeneous products, or in industries where it would be extremely difficult for a 
classic cartel to monitor prices or to detect firms that deviate from agreed-upon prices.”; see 
also Calif. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n., 224 F.3d 942, 943 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that the association’s refusal to release X-rays from patients to insurers was a rule-making 
collusion that was per se illegal and similar to a refusal to compete on price that harmed 
consumers with higher insurance premiums.)  
169 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 7, at 24. 
170 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 7, at 25. 
171 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 7, at 25. (The market would show signs to vulnerability 
if there had been a history of collusion in the relevant market or failed attempts for collusive 
conduct in another geographic or product market).  
172 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 7.1, at 25. 
173 Allen, supra note 57. 
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pricing.174  Additionally, as collusion relates to data, companies can easily 
share data, which is a practice that major companies have been under 
increased scrutiny for, such as Facebook.175 Therefore, if Walmart and 
Humana were permitted to merge, there would be a strong potential for 
coordinated effects in the market.  
 
5. (7) Powerful Buyers 
 
     Powerful buyers generally can negotiate favorable terms and lower costs 
based on the volume of business conducted, but the favorable terms can also 
reflect price discrimination in their favor.176  When agencies review mergers, 
they consider whether the presence of powerful buyers obviates the potential 
for collusive activity.177  If the merger consists of a powerful buyer in the 
marketplace, that buyer could also use their ability to negatively impact prices 
based on their volume of purchases.178  As an example, Walmart is currently 
contracting with six healthcare organizations nationwide to provide its health 
plan-covered employees with no out-of-pocket costs for certain surgeries.179  
Another example of this practice is Amazon selling online ads to a chain of 
physical therapy centers with the intent of targeting customers who live near 
these centers and had recently bought knee braces through Amazon.180  
Walmart, after partnering with Google and Google Home, has the same 
capability as Amazon’s Alexa to target consumers.181  If powerful buyers like 
Walmart can enter the Consumer Healthcare Data Market with the amount 
 
174 See generally Lande, supra note 163. 
175 Matt Weinberger, Facebook is reportedly under criminal investigation over deals that 
gave Apple, Amazon, and other companies access to user data, BUSINESS INSIDER, Mar. 13, 
2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-criminal-investigation-data-sharing-
2019-3. 
176 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 8, at 27.  
177 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 8, at 27. (“This can occur, for example, if powerful 
buyers have the ability and incentive to vertically integrate upstream or sponsor entry, or if 
the conduct or presence of large buyers undermines coordinated effects.”). 
178 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 8, at 27. (“Agencies do not presume that the presence 
of powerful buyers alone forestalls adverse competitive effects flowing from a merger.”). 
179 Chris Anderson, Wal-Mart Emphasizes Outcomes, Value in Centers of Excellence 
Program, HEALTHCARE FINANCE NEWS, Oct. 12, 2012,  
https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/walmart-emphasizes-outcomes-value-
centers-excellence-program. 
180 Karen Weise, Amazon Knows What You Buy. And It’s Building a Big Ad Business From 
It, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 20, 2019,  
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/20/technology/amazon-ads-advertising.html. 
181 Daisuke Wakanayashi & Michael Corkery, Google and Walmart Partner With Eye on 
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and sophistication of the data that they have on their consumers, they become 
a threat to the competitive market.  
 
6. (8) Entry into the Relevant Market 
 
     When analyzing entry into the market, a reviewing agency will look at 
pre-existing plans that are induced by the merger.182  The agency will 
consider the entry sufficient to alleviate any anti-competitive concern if entry 
into the relevant market is deemed “easy.” 183  Entry into a relevant market is 
considered easy when such entry is “timely, likely, and sufficient in its 
magnitude, character, and scope to deter or counteract the competitive effects 
of concern.”184  When evaluating timeliness, the entrance must be rapid 
enough to deter a potential monopolist from charging monopoly pricing, 
making it unprofitable because the new entrant to the market would, in 
theory, lower prices in order to take away market share from their rivals in 
the industry.185  An entrant is likely to the relevant market if it is profitable 
for a firm to sell goods into that market.186  
     In Heinz, a new entrant to the market was not likely because of the barriers 
to entry, including economies of scale, high fees for getting the product into 
stores, lack of brand recognition, and lack of trust of the firms in the 
market.187  However, even if an entry were to be both timely and likely, it 
may not be sufficient to counteract the anti-competitive effects.188  For 
example, a new entrant into the healthcare market will likely not be a 
monopolist if that entrant is not able to provide targeted ads for potential new 
consumers based on their location services, a technique that Amazon 
employs.189  The issue with the Consumer Healthcare Data Market is exactly 
the type of “valuable intangible asset, which may be difficult or time 
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consuming for an entrant to replicate,” which would make an entry into the 
market unlikely to counteract the anti-competitive effects of a merger.190  
Companies would now have to acquire data on 95% of American consumers 
in order to remain competitive.191 
 
7. (9) Efficiencies of the Merger; (10) Failing Companies or Divisions; (11) 
Mergers of Competing Buyers; and (12) Partial Acquisitions 
 
     When a company is charged with a merger that is perceived as anti-
competitive, it may be able to combat that perception through an efficiency 
or failing company or division defense.192  However, any efficiencies gained 
during a merger must be merger-specific.193  An efficiency is considered to 
be merger-specific when the merging companies can demonstrate to a court 
that the efficiency would not be possible unless the companies were allowed 
to merge.194  Walmart and Humana would likely be able to claim a number 
of efficiencies that would result from the merger, such as using Walmart to 
provide Humana with the largest information technology infrastructure of 
any company in the world.195  Walmart would also be able to create a true 
one-stop-shop for customers through its stores and the healthcare clinics that 
Walmart is constructing.196  Another efficiency the companies would be able 
to claim is that Humana customers would have the advantage with Walmart 
to negotiate rates for healthcare services, as they are doing now.197 
     However, as the decision in Brown Shoe demonstrates, claiming an 
efficiency defense can be difficult to prove.198  In Brown Shoe, a case 
involving a horizontal and vertical merger, the efficiencies came from being 
able to integrate manufacturing and retail facilities.199  However, the 
government met its burden of proof in showing that these integrated facilities 
had a tendency toward concentration in the market that would result in anti-
competitive effects.200  Similarly, in Heinz, the merger would have resulted 
in efficiencies such as economies of scale with manufacturing, better 
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manufacturing processes, and better product formulas.201  In Heinz, the 
merger was stopped because the efficiencies were not merger-specific, or in 
other words, could have been achieved by means other than through the 
merger.202   
     As in Heinz, the Walmart-Humana merger could likely achieve many of 
the potential efficiencies by other means, such as increased research and 
development for a better technology infrastructure.203 Therefore, the merger 
should not be permitted on an efficiency basis because the efficiencies gained 
in the Walmart-Humana merger are not merger-specific. 
     A company needs to demonstrate to a court that absent a merger, the 
company or division would fail in order to assert the failing company or 
division defense.204  Specifically, to demonstrate the failing company or 
division defense, a company shows that there is a grave probability that the 
business or division will fail,205 and a failing company or division must show 
that it attempted to search for a less anti-competitive purchaser.206  However, 
neither company is likely to raise this defense as both Walmart and Humana 
have strong earnings.207 
     Mergers of competing buyers, just like mergers of competing sellers, can 
enhance market power and lead to anti-competitive effects.208  The market 
power of powerful buyers is sometimes referred to as “monopsony power” 
leading to “monoposonization” violations.209  In evaluating monopsony 
concerns, the essential elements of monoposonization violations are the 
mirror image of the elements of monopolization.210  Thus, the merger of 
competing buyers is likely to lessen competition in a manner that is harmful 
to sellers and, ultimately, consumers in a relevant market.211 
 
201 see Heinz, 246 F.3d at 722. 
202 Heinz, 246 F.3d at 723-24. 
203 Heinz, 246 F.3d at 722; see also Heath, supra note 194. 
204 See Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969). 
205 Id. at 138-40 (Explaining that although the fact that some companies may go out of 
business does not justify a cartel or joint venture.)  
206 Id. 
207 Bret Kenwell, Trading Walmart Stock After Earnings Jump, THESTREET (Feb. 19, 2019, 
4:59 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/investing/earnings/trading-walmart-stock-after-
earnings-14871045; Edmund Ingham, Positive Earnings Report, Growth In Its Flagship 
Product And Focus On Personalised Health: Humana A Strong Growth Proposition For 
Short To Medium Term, SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 26, 2019, 10:37 AM), 
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4244218-positive-earnings-report-growth-flagship-
product-focus-personalised-health-humana-strong. 
208 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 12, at 32-33. 
209 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 12, at 32. 
210 Allen v. Dairy Farmers of America, Inc., 2014-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 78807, 2014 WL 
2610613 (D. Vt. 2014).  
211 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 12, at 33. 
 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 50.1 52 
     Finally, the agencies also review acquisitions of minority positions 
involving competing firms, even if those minority positions do not 
necessarily eliminate competition between the parties to the transaction.212  If 
an agency determines that the partial acquisition will result in effective 
control of or involve substantially all of the assets of the target firm, the 
partial acquisition will be analyzed just like a merger.213  As an example, if 
Walmart partially acquired a substantial portion of shares in Walgreens, it 
may be able to influence the competitive conduct of Walgreens.  Walmart 
could influence the competitive conduct of Walgreens through a voting 
interest that may give Walmart the power to appoint members to the board of 
directors.  This acquisition of a minority position could directly impact 
Walgreens’ competitive conduct, reduce the incentive of Walmart to compete 
with Walgreens,214 or give Walmart access to competitively sensitive 
information from Walgreens.215 In conclusion, the Twelve-Part Rule of 
Reason analysis applied to Walmart and Humana means that the hypothetical 
resulting merger would be anti-competitive and in violation of the Sherman 




A. The Need for Stricter State and Federal Enforcement 
 
     Maryland’s Attorney General has concurrent authority with the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and FTC under the Sherman and Clayton Acts 
to prevent mergers between companies in the Consumer Retail Data and 
Health Insurance Markets that unreasonably restrain trade.216  As such, 
Maryland’s Attorney General, the DOJ, and the FTC should take a new 
approach in analyzing mergers to prevent companies like Amazon and 
Walmart from gaining a foothold in the healthcare industry.  The issue with 
new companies entering the Consumer Data Market is that “companies are 
not successful because they have a lot of data, they have a lot of data because 
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they’re successful.”217  Data is essentially the source of a company’s 
intellectual capital, and to punish companies for it would be tantamount to 
discouraging success.218 
     Discouraging competition is against the basic principles of antitrust law in 
the United States,219 but companies still cannot use their monopoly power in 
one market to gain monopoly power in another.220 Even if the Consumer 
Healthcare Data Market was considered a “new market” for antitrust 
enforcement, the principles of preserving free and unfettered competition 
remain the same.221  In U.S. v. Microsoft, the technology company was 
accused of abusing its monopoly power by integrating and bundling its 
operating services with its web browser software.222  This would result in 
Microsoft having a monopoly in the web browser market in addition to its 
monopoly in the operating services market. However, the case was ultimately 
settled after the DOJ decided not to seek the break up of Microsoft, but rather 
to allow personal computer manufacturers to adopt non-Microsoft 
software.223  The Microsoft case is a prime example of an enforcement action 
against a company in a new market that was using its intellectual property, 
similar to the way data is used in the Consumer Data Market, to exercise its 
monopoly power.224  
     To ensure success while bringing suit under the Sherman Act or FTC Act 
against potential monopolists in the Consumer Healthcare Data Market is 
through a detailed product definition.225  By narrowly defining the product 
market, the market shares of the merging parties is often a prima facie 
showing of a violation of the antitrust laws.226  For example, in Staples, the 
FTC was able to convince a U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 
that office supply stores were a completely separate market from other 
companies selling identical office supplies.227  This case shows that through 
a narrow definition of the product market, it is not relevant that other 
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companies are providing similar products or services to consumers.  On the 
other hand, when the relevant market is too broadly defined, it is unlikely that 
the merger will be found unlawful because the market shares of the merging 
entities are much smaller.228 By focusing on a narrow product definition of 
the Consumer Healthcare Data Market, rather than the broad Consumer Data 
Market, and a narrow geographic market of Maryland, there will be a much 
better chance for enforcement success.229 
     Additionally, without narrowly defining the product market, any potential 
enforcement may run into similar issues that arose in du Pont with the 
Cellophane Fallacy.230  In du Pont, the product market at issue was 
Cellophane, the water-proof plastic wrap that is used on cigarette boxes.231  
When defining the product market, du Pont was successful in convincing the 
court that it did not have a monopoly because Cellophane was also used on 
products other than cigarettes, such as meat.232  Since Cellophane was a 
product that did not meet the hypothetical monopolist test based on its uses 
for products other than cigarettes, in addition to already charging monopoly 
pricing, the Cellophane Fallacy came into existence.233  Had the government 
been able to narrow the market definition, to only apply to cigarette 
packaging, du Pont would have failed the hypothetical monopolist test 
because more consumers responded to a price increase for cigarette 
packaging.234 
     For Maryland’s Attorney General to be successful in litigating the 
potential Walmart-Humana merger, they will need to follow the Twelve-Step 
Rule of Reason analysis to ensure that all of the pro-competitive and anti-
competitive effects are fully understood. However, as demonstrated above,235 
the Achilles heel of antitrust enforcement actions has been a failure to 
narrowly define the relevant market. In the instant analysis, the Twelve-Step 
Rule of Reason analysis will lead to a demonstration that the merger between 
Walmart and Humana is anti-competitive.  The Attorney General will be able 
to narrowly define Consumer Healthcare Data Market through the linked 
Consumer Retail Data and Health Insurance Markets.  Additionally, by 
narrowly defining the Consumer Healthcare Data Market, the Attorney 
General will be able to show that a new market, driven by data, has been 
rapidly growing and has very real anti-competitive effects for Marylanders.  
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Finally, the Attorney General needs to ensure that the demonstrated anti-
competitive effects outweigh any pro-competitive effects.  
 
B. Increased Need for State and Federal Regulation 
 
     As Microsoft lost the ability to have a PC monopoly with the browser 
market, in order to counter Walmart’s monopoly power, users should be the 
primary owners of their data. While outside of the field of antitrust, state and 
federal regulators could accomplish this by permitting consumers the right to 
control their data, prevent companies from using it, or to withdraw their data 
in a usable format.236  There are two recent examples of government 
regulators allowing consumers to have more control over their data.  First, 
the European Union recently implemented the General Data Protection 
Requirements (“GDPR”) that imposes strict penalties on companies that do 
not comply with its rules of data capture, storage, usage, and sharing.237  
Second, California recently passed a similar law to GDPR, the California 
Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) that makes California the developer of 
guidelines on consumer data, rather than a company’s internal decision-
makers.238  While these legislative efforts focus on data privacy, rather than 
a curb on the antitrust violations in the Consumer Healthcare Data Market, 
the legislation represents a model for Maryland and the U.S. Government to 
follow.239  The GDPR represented a cosmic shift in the use of enforcement 
actions to start to reign in the power of companies and protect consumers 
from the technology sector.  However, that cosmic shift in enforcement 
actions still has many gaps that could be addressed with future legislation.  
Some of those gaps include how data should be addressed in antitrust 
enforcement and provide greater protection to consumers. 
     California’s CCPA represents what is sure to be the first of many attempts 
by several states to address the use of consumer data by companies.240  
However, to promote consistent laws in commerce and to have a more 
effective enforcement mechanism that all states can follow, it would be more 
effective for Congress to address the issue.  If Congress does not act to solve 
the issues with data in antitrust enforcement, Maryland should take steps to 
lead with antitrust regulations that protect Marylanders from anti-competitive 
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effects, as California has with consumer data in the CCPA. The federal 
government could seek to address this issue in two ways.   
     First, the DOJ or FTC could engage in rulemaking as prescribed by the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and comment process.241  However, 
this process can be lengthy, and it would not have an immediate impact on 
the fast-growing Consumer Healthcare Data Market.  This delay would leave 
consumers with higher prices until the notice and comment period ends.  
Second, Congress could enact legislation that specifically targets the 
Consumer Healthcare Data Market to prevent antitrust violations in the 
industry.  
     If regulators did increase consumers’ rights to and control over their data, 
it might foster competition in the market to improve quality of services to 
retain customer data or lower barriers to entry for less data-rich innovators.242  
Additionally, by regulating the way that companies can use consumers’ data 
and how consumers can monitor and control a company’s use of their data, 
regulators can work to ensure a competitive market without the massive cost 




     The Consumer Data Market, which is something that affects every citizen 
in the United States, has never been more important to focus on than now.  
Healthcare costs in the United States have continued to rise and present a 
massive issue for consumers who are seeking to address the exorbitant costs 
while maintaining a competitive healthcare market.244  The federal 
government needs to take action by enforcing the current antitrust laws and 
creating new laws that will strengthen antitrust enforcement capabilities by 
accounting for changes in today’s economy.  These enforcement actions and 
new laws will continue to encourage businesses to be innovative while 
curbing rampant abuse by companies that are using their monopoly power to 
charge higher prices to consumers for healthcare services.  Through data 
regulations, Maryland can protect its citizens from the potential abuse of their 
data in the healthcare industry and ensure that the healthcare market remains 
competitive. 
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